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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to estimate the implicit risk premium from fluctuating tax revenue. We provide 
a number of reasons for the absence of the risk premium from the public borrowing rate. One 
reason can be viewed as the value society places on the ability of the tax system to act as an 
automatic built-in stabilizer. Empirically the annual value of this implicit risk premium for the US 
is the estimated at 2.45 percent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ax revenue accruing to the government, being primarily functions of the aggregate return to labour 
and capital, embodies systematic risk. Thus when public debt is issued to fund a new expenditure, 
government is forced to resort to using future „risky‟ revenues to service the debt and eventually to 
pay it off. Thus if investors were to appraise long-term government bonds like any other private contingent claims, 
they would be led to value the risk implicit in the future tax revenue flows. While the macro aggregates such as 
labour or even capital income at the national level may allow a greater degree of idiosyncratic risk-pooling than say 
the collateral put up by private borrowers, it is not plausible that future tax revenues would be riskless in the 
aggregate.  
 
The instability of tax revenue is heightened due to the built-in automatic stabilization policy and, where 
relevant, the deliberate counter-cyclical fiscal measures. The state through progressive taxation and built-in transfers 
helps smooth net receipts of households and firms. The policy cushions an agent‟s hardship during bad economic 
times; by the same token, during economic prosperity it allows the government to collect more in taxes and give less 
in transfers. In severe downturns governments also devise discretionary fiscal interventions which add additional 
instability to the revenue-expenditure system. While the latter are not in the nature of „built-in‟ measures, these have 
nevertheless been routinely employed by most governments in the post-War period. These tools of economic 
stabilization reduce the systematic risk the private sector faces at a given point in time and transfer it to the 
government budget.  
 
The objective of this paper is to determine the implicit risk premium that risk-averse investors would 
ideally demand in order to hold government bonds in the full knowledge that the yields are backed by risky tax 
revenues, but ignore the fact that coercive powers of the state may make the interest obligations fully secure. A 
methodology is developed in order to identify the implicit risk premium in various tax revenue flows. Possible 
applications of the methodology described in the paper can be used to estimate risk premiums of different types of 
human capital investments, small business valuations, social insurance benefits, and other publicly non-traded assets. A 
number of reasons as to why the government can borrow at a lower rate than the risk adjusted discount rate are also 
discussed this paper.  
 
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the basic methodology of evaluating the risk 
premium for non-traded assets is presented. Section 3 applies the above methodology to the case of tax revenue flows. 
Section 4 provides an estimate for the implicit risk premium in these flows. Section 5 offers alternative explanations as to 
why the above risk premium is absent from government bonds and offers concluding remarks. 
T 
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2.  METHODOLOGY FOR VALUING THE IMPLICIT RISK PREMIUM 
 
In order to model the risk premium implicit in tax revenue flows, one needs to conceptualise the current market 
price of future revenue entitlement. To motivate the discussion, consider a government currently willing to borrow the 
market value of its future revenue claims (due k-periods from now). As
sum
ing
 that 
investors hold a 
diversified
 portfolio, they 
would calculate the risk embedded in the asset by 
evaluat
ing
 the 
systematic risk of the 
future tax revenue
 stream, j. Once a 
particular tax revenue flow has been assigned a “price”, one is led to the idea of the return that the holder of the 
entitlement would earn from such a hypothetical debt instrument. R
ational 
portfolio 
investors 
would therefore 
be willing to lend to the 
issuer 
at time
-
t 
an expected amount 
P
jt in exchange of the promise of the expected value of the stochastic flow 
R
j,t+ k
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later
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2.1 
 
In the expression above, Pjt may be interpreted as the current “market price” of a claim on the future expected revenue 
stream
, 
(Rj,t+k), while Et denotes the expectations operator, and
 j is the risk discount
 
rate.
1
 The discount rate that explicitly 
adjusts for the riskiness of the revenue stream may be given by the security market equilibrium condition which states 
that the expected return on an investment equals the sum of the risk free rate and a risk premium term that is 
proportional to the excess return on the market portfolio given by: 
 
,))(()( fmjfj rrErE    
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where )( jE  is the expected discount rate, ft
r  is the risk free rate, )( mrE is the expected market return and 
)var(
),cov(
,
,,
tm
tmtj
j
r
rr
b   measures the systematic risk of the security.2  
 
The security market line can be used to empirically obtain the risk premium associated with securities that 
actually trade in the market since asset prices and dividend yields are observed. In the case of non-traded assets, the 
security market line is not applicable since the beta coefficient cannot be computed due to the non-existence of data on 
asset prices.
 
 Below is a description of an alternative methodology for measuring the implicit risk premium on non-
traded assets. 
 
The starting line towards the development of the implicit risk premium is to compare the determinants of 
the returns of two assets. One asset, say asset-i, is actively traded in the market while the other asset, say asset-j, is 
not.  
 
Next, we make the reasonable assumption that the price to earnings ratio (PER) of a traded asset is mean 
reverting and hence stationary around a long run equilibrium value. Denoting the price behaviour of a traded asset-i 
at time-t, Pit, and the earnings per share, Iit, the price to earnings ratio is hypothesized to follow a simple 
autoregressive process: 
 
ititit upccp  110 , 2.3 
 
                                                 
1 In the finance literature this basic valuation formula has been disputed on grounds that asset prices display excessive volatility 
relative to the anticipated stream of future dividends (Shiller, 1981). 
2 For the development of the capital asset pricing model and the security market line, see Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966). 
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 . The assumption of stationarity guarantees 
that the price to earnings ratio is mean reverting. Figure 1 shows the historical price to earnings ratio for the 
Standard and Poor 500 index.
3
 For the S&P 500 index (1872-2008), the estimation of the above equation is shown 
below as: 
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In order to examine whether the price to earnings ratio is stationary, the Dickey-Fuller (1979) test was 
applied by estimating:
4
 ititiiit pap   110 . The estimated coefficient of i1  is -0.258, and has a t-value of -
4.41. Therefore, one can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 1% level of significance. The price to 
earnings ratio of the S&P 500 index (1871-2008) is therefore mean reverting. The PER is reverting to its historical 
average value, estimated to be approximately 14. Given this hypothesis, the steady state the growth rate of the price 
of a traded asset-i will equal the growth rate of its earnings per share:
5
 
 
,))(())(( itit IgEPgE    2.4 
 
where g(x) denotes the growth rate of any variable-x, a notational feature that this paper shall maintain throughout. 
                                                 
3 The data used here are taken from Robert Shiller's homepage: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/.    
4 The critical value from the Dickey Fuller table is –3.42. No lagged terms were necessary since the residuals from this regression 
behaved appropriately.  
5 Using Shiller's historical annual series from 1871-2008 confirms the equality of the unconditional means of the two series. The 
annual average geometric growth of the S&P500 index adjusted for inflation during this period of time was 2.17% with a 
standard deviation of 17.3%, while the earnings per share grew at 0.997% with a standard deviation of 24.7%. Thus the 
difference in sample means is -1.177% with the t-statistics from a paired difference test equal to 1.21. Thus one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the unconditional means are equal in the long run. 
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Suppose a second asset-j is introduced, which is not traded in financial markets but has a claim on a particular risky 
tax revenue flow. We introduce the notion of the imputed price to earnings ratio (IPER) as a measure to evaluate 
risk. The minimal condition that will be required here is that the IPER be defined, and that it be stationary. While it 
is required that the IPER for asset-j is governed by a stationary process, its unconditional mean may well be 
different from that of asset-i. However, asset-j will also satisfy the long run condition that
)}({)}({ jtjt IgEPgE  much as if it were actually traded in the market.  
 
The expected return from any security is not just the price appreciation component but also includes 
dividend yields. The expected total return from an investment-z is therefore given by the sum:
))(()( ztztzt dPgErE  , z =i, j, etc.
 
Thus in the long run, the following is true about the difference in expected 
returns of the two assets: 
 
))(())(()()( jtjtititjtit dIgEdIgErErE   
2.5 
 
Differences in the expected returns are governed by differences in the expected growth of earnings and 
dividend yield of the respective assets. Until now we have used only unconditional means. In order to derive the 
implicit risk premium a model is required which determines the above variables. Thus the estimation of the implicit 
risk premium becomes conditional on the model used and on the information set available to the investor. 
 
First, assume that the rate of return on the assets is governed by the security market line as indicated in 
equation 2.2. The growth of earnings plus dividends depends on a set of macroeconomic and firm specific variables 
contained in the vector set  . Substituting these conditions into equation (2.5) yields:6 
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In order to determine the beta of an asset that is not traded actively, hypothesize that the conditional 
expected growth rate of earnings plus the dividend yield for any asset-k depends, amongst other variables, on the 
growth rate of GDP,     , (or, for that matter, any common aggregate indicator embodying systematic risk, 
i.e.,                    )). Furthermore, the conditional expected excess return of the market also depends on 
this same macro variable. Taking the partial derivatives on both sides of 2.6 with respect to the growth rate of the 
economy,      : 
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2.7 
 
Assume that one of the assets represents the market portfolio, say asset-i, (i.e., let i = m), then (2.7) 
simplifies since the market‟s beta is known to be unity as follows: 
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The first term in 2.8 is zero 
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 provided that the risk free rate is 
                                                 
6 In effect it is assumed that the non-traded asset would be priced according to the security market line.  
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not affected by changes in the growth rate of output This equality condition can be derived from condition 2.4 which 
is the outcome of a stationary price to earnings ratio. Alternatively this assumption can be tested using arbitrage 
pricing theory (APT). The excess market return according to APT as developed by Ross (1976), and later expanded 
by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Burmeister and Wall (1986) is, amongst others, determined by macroeconomic 
factors such as unexpected GDP fluctuations. According to the APT model, the market risk premium is related to 
GDP via a beta sensitivity parameter, λm which measures the sensitivity of the market risk premium to unexpected 
movements in the growth rate of GDP.
7
 Hence in expectation terms, the market risk premium changes with the 
growth rate of output as follows:
 m
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. Thus for the first term in 2.8 to be zero it must be the 
case that mm a  where it is assumed that the market‟s earnings growth plus dividend yield are sensitive to 
economic growth as well: m
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. The estimation of the two models over the sample period 
1950-2008 is illustrated in table 2.1 using seemingly unrelated regression equations since the error terms might be 
correlated:
 8
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Table 2.1: Sensitivity of Market to Economic Fluctuations 
 Constant 
Term 
Sensitivity Factor Adjusted 
R-Square 
System R-Square 
Excess Returns of the 
S&P500 
0.0573 * 
(0.016) 
3.266 * 
(0.748) 
0.244 0.276 
Growth rate of 
earnings + dividend 
yield of the S&P500 
 
0.0434 
(0.028) 
 
2.915 ** 
(1.275) 
 
0.081 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the 1% level. ** at the 5% level.  Cross equation 
restriction holds as the Wald chi-square statistics yields a p-value of 0.80 
 
 
The cross equation restriction mm a  is not rejected. The intercept term in the first equation of table 2.1 
indicates the sample average excess return over the 1950-2008 sample periods, i.e., the market risk premium is 
estimated at 5.73 percent.
9
 Over the same sample period (1950-2008), the geometric mean real return on the S&P500 
index has been
 
7.9 percent annually (inclusive of dividends). Similarly, the intercept term of the second equation in table 
2.1 indicates the growth rate of earnings plus dividends to be 4.34 percent.  
 
Therefore, given the restriction, along a steady state the following expression emerges for asset-j‟s beta: 
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7 This analysis is not affected by introducing multiple factors since these additional factors are unexpected changes in 
macroeconomic variables and unrelated to unexpected changes to GDP growth. 
8 The sensitivity is estimated by expressing the output term as a deviation from the trend level, and suitably adding a constant 
term. This yields the single factor arbitrage pricing model. 
9 These figures are in accordance with the equity premium literature [e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)].   
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Thus if the two sensitivities are equal ( mja  ) then the beta of the “non-traded” asset is unity    ( 1jb ) 
just like the market‟s beta. Otherwise, if ja  is smaller (larger) than m , the beta will then be smaller (greater) than 
unity. For example, if the non-traded asset‟s growth rate of earnings and dividend yield is not sensitive to 
fluctuations in the growth rate of economy, then the beta will be zero implying no market risk premium due to 
economic fluctuations. Thus the beta of any asset is determined by the ratio of the relative sensitivities of the asset‟s 
sensitivity factor with respect to the state of the economy relative to the market‟s risk premium sensitivity with 
respect to the economy. The above analysis therefore illustrates a procedure by which one may empirically estimate 
the beta coefficient, and thus the risk premium, for a non-traded asset.
 10
 From equation 2.9, to estimate the beta, one 
only needs to estimate one additional parameter, namely aj, and there is no need to have information on the asset‟s 
price. 
 
3.  SENSITIVITY FACTOR OF REVENUE FLOWS 
 
In this section, an attempt is made to estimate the sensitivity of tax revenue to that of economic growth in order 
to obtain a reliable estimate of the sensitivity factor in the numerator of equation 2.9. The implicit risk premium is 
estimated on the following tax revenue flows; personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), social insurance 
contributions (SIC), excise tax (EXT), and total tax revenue streams (TOT). The interpretation of the various revenue 
categories-j are examples of the implicit yields on the corresponding asset-j, which serve as the second asset as 
analytically modelled in section 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The data covers the period 1950-2008 and are obtained from the Office of Management of Budget (OMB) 
website.
11 
Figure 2 shows the pattern of personal, corporate, social insurance contributions, excise and total tax 
revenue, in real terms, over the above period. From the pattern of the data one can see that the personal, social 
insurance contributions and total tax revenue have trended upwards with fluctuations along the path, while corporate 
and the excise tax revenue do not show any apparent trend other than being very volatile.  
  
                                                 
10 Barro (1979) has argued, governments appear not to change the rate schedule and tax code too frequently due to concern over 
the efficiency costs of the tax system. Thus even though observed variations in the growth rates of revenues may suffer from the 
noise due to legislative tinkering with the tax code, it can be shown that one may still obtain an estimate of the risk premiums 
implicit in the tax revenue flows. See also Groves and Kahn (1952). 
11 The website is http://www.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/index.html. Table 2.1 of the historical data were used for the main tax 
receipts categories such as individual income tax receipts, corporate income tax receipt, social insurance contributions and 
retirement receipts, excise tax, and total receipts. The GDP and the deflator were obtained from table 10.1 of the same source.  
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 Table 3.1 provides some descriptive statistics on the real growth in various tax revenue,
 
g(Rjt)
. 
This table 
indicates that average rates of growth have been positive and quite large for the three largest tax revenue sources. 
The largest average growth is observed in social insurance contributions (SIC). The highest standard deviation is 
observed, not unexpectedly, in the case of the corporate income tax (CIT). Note that the volatility of CIT growth is 
significantly higher than most other public flows; the standard deviation for CIT is approximately 17 percent vs. 8 
percent for the growth rate of the personal income tax revenue. The t-stats column for the sample average growth 
rate indicates that all the average growth rates are significant except for the corporate tax and the excise tax revenue. 
Observe that the year-on-year fluctuations in corporate tax revenue have been most volatile during the 1950-2008 period 
rendering its sample average value insignificant
.
 The table also shows that growth rate of GDP, denoted by G(Y), 
over the same period has been very stable, which would imply a degree of flexibility of the tax system in absorbing 
aggregate risks.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics on Revenue and GDP Growth Rates: 1950-2008 
Variable Mean 
Growth 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-stats 
For mean 
Minimum Growth 
(year) 
Maximum 
Growth 
(year) GPIT 0.0390 0.075 3.993 -0.166 (06) 0.264 (51) 
GCIT 0.0221 0.166 1.024 -0.340 (01) 0.393 (84) 
GSIC 0.0589 0.054 8.400 -0.009 (02) 0.216 (51) 
GEXT 0.0033 0.092 0.278 -0.184 (82) 0.425 (81) 
GTOT 0.0366 0.063 4.445 -0.091 (02) 0.217 (51) 
G(Y) 0.0332 0.022 11.65 -0.018 (75) 0.107 (51) 
Notes. The prefix-G in the first column denotes annualized growth rate; thus GPIT stands for the growth rate of PIT. Similarly for 
the other revenue categories, while G(Y) denotes the growth rate of GDP. The growth rates are computed as the difference in the 
natural logarithm from year to year. All data have been adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator. 
 
 
A tax revenue function can be represented as follows:  
 
,)),(()( jttjttjt YFBFR   
3.1 
 
where Rjt is the real tax revenue received by the government from the j-th source, while F(t) is the tax schedule, and 
Bjt(F(), Yjt,) denotes the tax base. The long run output is given by a function, Y =Y(N, K, T), where the independent 
variables are population (N), stock of capital (K), technology (T). Given (3.1), it is hypothesized that the tax revenue 
is a stable exponential function of GDP,
jtj eAYR tjt

 , where jt is a random error term with mean zero. It will 
be convenient to express the above in the log-linear form: 
 
jttjjjt YR   lnln 10  
3.2 
 
The 1j-coefficient in the above regression is the long run output elasticity of tax revenue-j [Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996), Williams et al. (1973)].  
 
 
In order to examine if the revenue variables are co-integrated with GDP equation 3.2 is estimated and two tests 
are applied to examine if the two variables are co-integrated. The tests are the co-integrating regression Durbin Watson 
(CRDW) test and the augmented (where relevant) Dickey-Fuller test.
12
 The null hypothesis of no co-integration is 
rejected for personal and total income tax streams using both tests. The evidence based on both tests indicates that the 
personal income tax and the total revenue are co-integrated with GDP. While CIT, SIC, and ET are not co-integrated 
                                                 
12 The tests used were suggested by Engel and Granger (1987). The CRDW and the augmented Dickey-Fuller are considered 
more powerful tests. 
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with GDP.
13
 Table 3.2 below presents the results:
14
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Co-Integration Results 
Co-Integrating 
Economic Variables 
Estimated 
Co-Integrating 
Coefficient using OLS 
R-Sq 
From OLS 
Estimation 
The CRDW 
Test: 
DW = 0 
Augmented 
DF Test: 
 = 0 15 
PIT with GDP 1.077 0.981 0.571 -4.92 
CIT with GDP 0.396 0.445 0.417 -2.51 
SIC with GDP 1.739 0.971 0.079 -1.24 
EXT with GDP 0.068 0.073 0.444 -2.71 
TOT with GDP 1.042 0.991 0.866 -5.01 
Note: The CRDW co-integration test is based on the Durbin Watson Statistics with Ho: DW = 0. The critical value as reported by 
Sargan and Bhargava based on 10,000 simulations executed from 100 observations at the 5%- level of significance is DW = 
0.386. Care must be exercised since the current sample has only 59 observations. Therefore the 1%- level of significance instead 
of the standard 5% is chosen. At this level, the CRDW critical value is 0.511. The critical value for the Dickey-Fuller co-
integration test at the10%-level is 3.04 
 
 
For the short run analysis an application of the theory of co-integration as developed by Granger (1981) and 
later expanded by Engel and Granger (1987) integrating the short run dynamics with long run equilibrium 
relationships is required.
16
 If the short run tax revenue and income variables are co-integrated then there exists an 
error correction mechanism such that the realised rate of growth of the actual revenue stream would depend on the 
growth rate of GDP and on the last period dis-equilibrium error obtainable from the long run relationship: 
 
jtjtjttjjt vRgaYgaaRg   )()()( 1211101  . 3.3 
 
In (3.3) ja1 measures the sensitivity of tax revenue with respect to output in the short run and will be used 
to compute the beta of the revenue flow once estimated. The coefficient 1 lying in the (-1,0)-interval measures the 
speed with which the error,  11011 lnln   tjjjtjt YR  , corrects the growth of tax revenue. If the revenue 
realised in the previous period exceeds the long run target then 01 jt , and given that 01  , it will reduce this 
period‟s revenue growth. The closer is this parameter to zero the slower will be the speed of adjustment. In the 
absence of co-integration, estimation of (3.3) proceeds without the dis-equilibrium error term. The last term 
)( 1jtRg  is used where necessary to make the error term white noise as required. The short run results are presented 
in Table 3.3, which demonstrates that there is a strong relationship between the growth behaviour of tax revenue and 
the evolution of the macro economy. 
 
The largest short run tax elasticity is obtained for the corporate tax revenue. A one-percent drop in 
economic growth results in nearly four-percent drop in the growth rate of CIT revenue. Even though there may 
appear no significant relationship between the two variables in the long run, there is indeed a strong relationship at 
the level of short run fluctuations suggesting that CIT revenue carries significant systematic risk.  
 
Corporate revenue apart, personal income tax and total tax revenues have income elasticities which are 
larger than the respective long run elasticities reported in Table 3.2. However, for both PIT and TOT, the growth 
                                                 
13 The absence of co-integration does not imply that a short run relationship does not exist between the two variables since 
differencing makes them stationary and the results cannot be spurious.   
14 Each of the variable examined, except EXT, has a unit root and hence is non-stationary. The results are available from the 
authors. 
15 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test included a constant term but without a time trend in the auxiliary regression. The number of 
lags included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals are 1 for PIT, 0 for CIT, 0 for SIC, 0 for ET, and 0 for TOT.  
16 If in fact GDP and the revenue variables are found not to be co-integrated, it implies that either there is no long run relationship 
between the two variables or that there is a third variable that is missing from the specification. 
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rate also depends strongly on last period's disequilibrium error (see column 4) as well as last period‟s growth rate. In 
fact, if the last period total revenue had increased beyond the sustainable long-run rate, say by 10 percent, the 
growth of revenue will fall (relative to the steady state rate) by about half this figure the following year. This implies 
that the government cannot merely increase the tax rate and expect an increase in the future growth rate of tax 
revenue if such a jump is not warranted by economic fundamentals. It is intuitive that tax revenue cannot grow 
beyond what is dictated by long run conditions. The speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium is extremely 
rapid (i.e., two years for total revenue). 
 
 
Table 3.3: Short run Income Sensitivity of Tax Revenue: 1950 – 2008 
Relation Constant 
Term: a0j 
Senstivity factor 
a1j 
Error Correction 
Term 
g(Rit-1) 
term: a2j 
Adjusted 
R-Sq 
D.W. 
GPIT with GGDP 
 
-0.0292 
(0.012) 
1.616 * 
(0.297) 
-0.387 * 
(0.076) 
0.425 * 
(0.077) 
0.618 
 
2.00 
GCIT with GGDP -0.1093 * 
(0.034) 
3.956 * 
(0.854) 
NA  0.261 2.17 
GSIC with GGDP 0.0224 
(0.012) 
1.098 * 
(0.291) 
NA  0.186 1.83 
GEXT with GGDP 
 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
0.360 
(0.551) 
NA  0.000 1.91 
GTOT with GGDP -0.023 
(0.010) 
1.394 * 
(0.248) 
-0.531 * 
(0.097) 
0.394 * 
(0.083) 
0.635 2.44 
Notes: The growth rate of the variables is denoted by the prefix-G; thus GPIT denotes the growth in personal income tax. * 
indicates significance at the 1% level. NA denotes the non-applicability of the error term, as the variables in question happen not 
to be co-integrated with output. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the estimated parameter. 
 
 
4.  THE IMPLICIT RISK PREMIUM AND DISCOUNT RATES 
 
Combining the estimated values of the sensitivity terms in Table 3.3 and Table 2.1 above, the beta is computed 
using 
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4.1 
 
for all the hypothetical assets that have exclusive claims on different tax categories analysed here. These are shown in the 
third column of Table 4.1 below. Following the security market equilibrium condition
))(()( fmjfj rrErE   , the risk premia for different assets are calculated as the product of the market risk 
premium and the asset-specific beta‟s. Given the estimated market risk premium is 5.73, and column 3 figures, the 
asset specific risk premia are shown in column four of Table 4.1. The final column in Table 4.1 illustrates the 
discount rate applicable to assets, which is obtained by adding the average risk free rate of 2.18. From the table one 
can observe that the financial markets would demand a very large risk premium on the corporate tax revenue. The figure 
in question is even higher than that applicable on the market portfolio and hence the certainty equivalent is expected to 
be zero. However, the risk premium drops significantly if one uses the remaining revenue categories. The estimates 
highlighted above suggest that the discount rate applicable to total public revenue, which is typically the de facto 
collateral for all public debt, is 4.66 percent annually vis-à-vis the market rate of 7.9 percent. 
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Table 4.1: Risk Premiums and Discount Rates: 1950 – 2008 
  Sensitivity Factors Estimated 
Beta (bj) 
Risk Premium Market Borrowing  
Rate (j) 
GPIT  1.616 0.495 2.835 5.053 
GCIT  3.956 1.211 6.941 9.158 
GSIC  1.098 0.336 1.926 4.144 
GEXT  0.360 0.110 0.632 2.849 
GTOT  1.394 0.427 2.446 4.663 
ERM      3.266 1.00 5.73 7.90 
 
 The government is able to borrow at lower rates than those reported in Table 4.1 for total revenue. Thus the 
risk premium is effectively zero for fluctuating tax revenue induced by aggregate shocks. The average short term 
risk free rate is estimated at 2.18 percent over this period and the estimated risk premium is 2.45 percent. Why is the 
risk premium of this size missing from government bonds? In the next section we offer some plausible reasons as to 
why it is absent. 
 
5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Why the risk premium attributable to fluctuating tax revenues does not form a part of the rate of return to 
private investors for holding government bonds has been addressed in the literature. One argument has been that the 
state‟s ability to engage in intergenerational risk sharing through a stochastic debt management policy renders risk 
premium insignificant (Gordon and Varian (1998)). The debt process typically pre-commits unborn generations in 
sharing aggregate risks with the current generation, which implies that the systematic risk facing a given generation 
becomes idiosyncratic when pooled with the independent lotteries of many generations to come.
17
 Another argument 
was brought forward by Pauly (1970). Pauly argued that the government has the ability to borrow at the risk free 
rate. He argued that “bonds are safe or certain because the government can always tax, either explicitly or implicitly 
by printing money, in order to pay interest on them” (1970, p196). The capital stock of a nation can serve as 
collateral. Thus the absence of a risk premium for fluctuating tax revenue occurs because the government is 
considered a trustworthy borrower provided the level of debt is not too high.  
 
Long ago, Musgrave and Miller (1948) recognized the importance of the “built-in-flexibility” of the tax 
system as a stabilization device. In their view, the quantitative value of the flexibility depended on two elements. 
First, that taxes are a large proportion of income (i.e., average tax rates are relatively high) and secondly that they 
are income-sensitive.
18
 Groves and Kahn (1952) stated that fluctuations in tax revenue are a blessing and instability 
of taxes a virtue particularly at the federal level: 
 
 “….. the federal government whose special and strategic position in the economy makes deficits and surpluses from 
fluctuating revenue a blessing and hence instability of taxes (built-in flexibility) a virtue…..” (p. 88) 
 
Thus the absence of the implicit risk premium for fluctuating tax revenue can also be interpreted as the value 
society places on the “built-in flexibility” of the tax system or instability of tax revenue. The government‟s ability to 
engage in intergenerational risk sharing through a stochastic debt management policy renders the risk premium on 
fluctuating tax revenue non-existent. The estimated implicit risk premium is 2.45 percent for the total revenue category 
which includes corporate tax revenue. The absence of this risk premium amounts to almost $1000 per capita in interest 
savings if all debt is considered. The tax system removes some of the systematic risk from the private economy through 
the tax system and transfers it onto the budget constraint through its debt management policy spread across many 
generations. 
 
In this paper we have developed a methodology to identify the existence of an implicit risk premium in tax 
revenue flows. We have also provided a number of reasons as to why the government can borrow at a lower rate than the 
risk adjusted discount rate found in this paper. Future research should attempt to identify the most important reason for 
the non appearance of this identified risk premium in government bonds.      
                                                 
17 See also Ahsan and Tsigaris (1998). 
18 See Pearse (1962), Smyth (1966) for subsequent analysis.  
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Possible applications of the methodology described in the paper can be used to estimate risk premiums of 
different types of human capital investments, small business valuations, social insurance benefits, and other publicly 
non-traded assets. 
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